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IMMUNE FROM REVIEW?: THRESHOLD ISSUES IN
SECTION 1983 CHALLENGES TO THE DELEGATE




Consider the following hypothetical political party policies. First, in a
continuing effort to emphasize strong "family values," the Republican
Party prohibits atheists from serving as delegates to its 1996 national
convention.' To be eligible to serve, each prospective convention dele-
gate must profess a devout faith in God. In addition, the party
designates certain splinter religious groups as "cults;" cult members also
are not welcome to serve as delegates.
At the same time, the Democratic Party expands the "Equal Division
Rule,"2 its affirmative action program, so that it becomes a strict quota
system. Under this new policy, the Democratic National Committee will
decide how many persons of each race, gender, religion and sexual orien-
tation will serve as delegates to the 1996 convention. Non-minority
party members in many areas will be unable to serve as delegates to the
convention.
In general, individuals like the atheist Republican or the non-minority
Democrat who are excluded from serving as delegates to their party's
convention in the hypotheticals above cannot mount successful constitu-
tional challenges to their party's actions. Most courts have interpreted
Supreme Court precedent to mean that political parties are immune from
judicial review-either because party action does not constitute state ac-
tion,3 or because the claim against the party is a nonjusticiable political
question.4 Indeed, the current "Equal Division Rule" of the Democratic
Party was upheld by the Fourth Circuit partly because the claim was
1. The 1992 Republican National Platform stated that "America must remain neu-
tral toward particular religions, but we must not remain neutral toward religion itself or
the values religion supports." The Platform: Party Stresses Family Values, Decentralized
Authority, Cong. Q., Aug. 22, 1992, at 2560, 2563 (text of the Republican National Plat-
form). In addition, in 1989, President Bush responded to a question regarding the patri-
otism of atheists: "I don't know that atheists should be considered citizens, nor should
they be considered patriots. This is one nation under God." Jennifer Spevacek, Atheist
Drops By to Wave the Flag, Wash. Times, July 27, 1989, at A4.
2. The "Equal Division Rule" was adopted by a resolution of the 1976 Democratic
National Convention. This rule requires that each state delegation contain an equal
number of men and women delegates and alternates. The rule was embodied in the Party
Charter at the 1980 convention and now applies to all organs of the party. See Bachur v.
Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 838-39 (4th Cir. 1987); Mary T. Boyle, Note,
Affirmative Action in the Democratic Party: An Analysis of the Equal Division Rule, 7 J.L
& Pol. 559, 583-85 (1991).
3. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
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held to be a political question.'
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code6 provides a vehicle
through which an individual can bring a constitutional challenge to a
national political party's delegate selection procedures. Two threshold
questions arise in an action brought against a political party under sec-
tion 1983. The first7 considers whether the party's act of selecting dele-
gates arises "under color of law"8 or, to put it differently, whether the
action constitutes "state action." 9 Courts use the state action doctrine to
examine whether the relationship between a private actor and the state is
sufficient to make constitutional scrutiny appropriate.' The second
threshold question addresses whether the claim is nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine." The political question doctrine tests
whether the federal judiciary is the appropriate forum in which to resolve
the controversy. 2 Traditionally, federal courts have employed this doc-
trine to avoid deciding cases that do not lend themselves to normal judi-
cial standards or that involve policy determinations that should be
decided by the legislative or executive branches.' 3
This Note examines whether an individual should be able to bring a
constitutional challenge to a political party's delegate selection proce-
dures under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, this Note explores the role
that the threshold issues of state action and justiciability 4 play within
such an inquiry. Part I provides an overview of the state action and
5. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 imposes liability in law or equity upon
any person who, while acting under color of state law, deprives another person of a con-
stitutional or federal statutory right. See id. Therefore, to state a claim under this stat-
ute, "plaintiffs must allege: 1) that they have been deprived of a federal right, and 2) that
the person who deprived them of that right acted under color of state or territorial law."
Jackson v. Michigan State Democratic Party, 593 F. Supp. 1033, 1044 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
7. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political
Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 935, 951-52 (1975); Barbara
Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for
Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1053, 1093 (1990).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
9. Courts have generally discussed the principles of the "under color of law" re-
quirement of section 1983 and the "state action" doctrine interchangeably. The Supreme
Court has recently held that "the two inquiries are the same." Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348, 2356 n.9 (1992). For an overview of this issue see Lawrence S. Kahn, State
Action and the "Under Color of Law" Requirement of 42 U.S. C. Section 1983, in Section
1983 Civil Rights Litigation and Attorneys' Fees 1992: Current Developments, at 339,
339 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 449, 1992).
10. See infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
11. See United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1425 (1992)("When a court concludes that an issue presents a nonjusticiable political question, it
declines to address the merits of that issue."); Wymbs v. Republican State Executive
Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must cross threshold of jus-
ticiability), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
12. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
14. Throughout this Note the terms "justiciability" and "political question doctrine"
are used interchangeably. Although justiciability also includes other doctrines such as
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political question doctrines. Part II traces the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of challenges to political party behavior. Part III examines the
conflicting approaches used by lower courts in addressing the threshold
issues in section 1983 challenges to a political party's delegate selection
procedures. Part IV argues that a closer look at the Supreme Court's
state action and justiciability jurisprudence suggests that political parties
should not be insulated from constitutional challenges to their delegate
selection activities. Finally, this Note concludes that, despite the differ-
ing approaches taken by the lower courts, Supreme Court precedent in
related contexts suggests that the courts should proceed beyond the
threshold issues of state action and justiciability to adjudicate the merits
of challenges to the delegate selection procedures of political parties.
I. THE STATE ACTION AND POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES
Courts use the state action and political question doctrines to analyze
whether the judiciary has the power to resolve a particular constitutional
claim. The state action doctrine considers whether the Constitution ap-
plies to the challenged conduct; the political question doctrine analyzes
whether the judiciary is the proper forum for resolving a particular con-
troversy. This section discusses these threshold issues."5
A. The Requirements of State Action Under Section 1983
In general, the Constitution does not apply to private conduct. Except
for the Thirteenth Amendment, the provisions of the Constitution are
binding only on the federal and state governments.16 For example, the
First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law"'"' that in-
fringes on certain rights, and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[n]o State shall"'" fail to protect certain rights.'9 There-
fore, only the federal or a state government, or a government or state
standing, mootness, and ripeness, the Supreme Court and many authorities often use the
term to refer to only the political question doctrine.
15. A more comprehensive survey of the state action and political question doctrines
is beyond the scope of this Note. For a fuller explanation of the doctrines see John E.
Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law §§ 2.15, 12.1 to 12.5 (4th ed. 1991);
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-1 (2d ed. 1988).
16. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991); Ripon
Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 424
U.S. 933 (1976); Tribe, supra note 15, § 18-1, at 1689 & n.1; Henry C. Strickland, The
State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 Hastings Coast. L.Q. 587, 591 (1991).
17. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added). In full, the First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." !d
18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). In full, section 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
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agent, can violate a citizen's constitutional rights."
Under section 1983, if a plaintiff alleges that a private party violated
one of his constitutional rights, the plaintiff must demonstrate some con-
nection between the state and the private action in order to show that the
defendant acted "under color of law."21 Courts use the state action doc-
trine22 to determine whether that connection between the state and the
private action is sufficient to transform the private act into an act of the
state. If a plaintiff shows a sufficient nexus between a defendant and the
government 23 or if the private party is carrying out a function tradition-
ally reserved to the government, 24 the private party is treated as having
taken on the qualities of, and therefore the responsibilities of, the state.25
Although the state action analysis is not mathematically precise and
must be made on a case-by-case basis, 26 the Supreme Court recently has
enunciated a two-pronged test for determining whether an action may be
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
19. The Thirteenth Amendment, however, has no similar qualifier and, therefore, is
binding on individuals as well as the government. Section 1 provides that: "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
20. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (discrimination violates
Constitution only when attributable to the state); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991) (Constitution's protections generally apply only to govern-
ment action).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
22. The analysis of the "under color of law" requirement of section 1983 and the
"state action" doctrine are identical. See supra note 9.
23. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716-17, 726 (1961)
(nexus between private coffee shop and government agency sufficient to warrant finding
of state action).
24. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (private company that
controlled entire town performed a public function sufficient to warrant finding of state
action).
25. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991)
("Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most
instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its
participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result,
be subject to constitutional constraints.")
26. Professor Laurence H. Tribe, for example, recognized that state action cases can-
not be placed into neat categories. He wrote:
The Court itself has acknowledged the stubborn individuality of the state action
cases. "[F]ormulating an infallible test" of state action, the Court has said, is
"an impossible task." "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can
the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." Professor Charles Black no doubt spoke for the consensus in con-
cluding that, viewed doctrinally, the state action cases are "a conceptual disas-
ter area."
Tribe, supra note 15, § 18-1 at 1690 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), and Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword, "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967), respectively).
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deemed the action of the state. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"' for
example, the Court held that state action was present when two require-
ments were satisfied. First, the deprivation of constitutional rights must
be caused by "the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State
or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible." '28 Second, the deprivation must be caused by some-
one who fairly can be called a "state actor."'29 Whether a particular case
satisfies this standard is often a factual inquiry,3" and the Court has done
little more than suggest certain relevant factors that lower courts should
consider.3 1 The factors that militate in favor of a finding of state action
are a reliance on government assistance, the performance of a "tradi-
tional government function," and an aggravation of the injury "in a
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." 32
B. The Justiciability of Political Questions
Courts use the political question doctrine to examine whether it is ap-
propriate for the judiciary to decide a particular issue. Separation of
powers concerns make courts wary of infringing on the executive and
legislative branches' policy-making prerogatives.3 3  Although several
commentators have argued that the political question doctrine is no
longer viable,3' as recently as January 1993 the Supreme Court has in-
voked the doctrine in refusing to decide an issue that concerned the im-
peachment powers of Congress.35
The Supreme Court has enunciated a two-pronged test 36 for determin-
Tribe thereafter argued that the "chaos" and "anarchy" surrounding state action cases
makes state action an "anti-doctrine." See Tribe, supra note 15, § 18-1, at 1691.
27. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
28. Id. at 937.
29. See id
30. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991) (citing
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
31. See id; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992) (citing Ed-
monson's list of relevant factors).
32. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083; Georgia v. McColIum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355
(1992); see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (relationship
between private coffee shop and government agency sufficiently close to warrant finding
of state action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private company that controlled
entire town performed a sufficient public function to warrant finding of state action).
33. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 747-48 (1993) (Souter, I., concurring);
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Ameri-
can Cetacean Soe'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
34. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politic A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643, 649 (1989). But see J. Peter Mulhern,
In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97 (1988).
35. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735, 740 (refusing to decide claim relating to the im-
peachment powers of Congress because it presented a nonjusticiable political question).
36. See id. at 735; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986); see also Wymbs v.
Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1082 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
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ing whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political question.37 The first
prong of this doctrine considers whether the courts must make an imper-
missible policy determination to resolve the case.3" In applying this
prong, courts analyze whether one of the other branches of government
has the exclusive authority to resolve the issue.3 9 To make this determi-
nation, courts interpret the constitutional provision at issue40 and ask
whether the Constitution has reserved the resolution of the issue to an-
37. The leading case on the political question doctrine is Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). One commentator has stated that subsequent political question doctrine "cases
have done little to expand or improve upon" Justice Brennan's work in Baker. Mulhern,
supra note 34, at 105; see, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121 (1986) ("The out-
lines of the political question doctrine were described and to a large extent defined in
Baker v. Carr.").
In Baker, the Supreme Court reviewed the voter apportionment scheme for electing
representatives to the Tennessee state legislature. The district lines had not been redrawn
for over 60 years and several areas, urban centers in particular, were significantly under-
represented in the legislature. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 191-93. The Court concluded that
the political question doctrine was not implicated because the doctrine only affected the
relationship between the federal judiciary and the other branches of the federal govern-
ment, see id. at 226, and held that the Equal Protection Clause claim could be sustained.
See id. at 237.
In Baker, the Court articulated the concerns present in any suit involving a political
question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossi-
bility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political ques-
tion's presence.
Id. at 217. Every major political question decision has quoted at least a portion of this
passage. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993); United States v. Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389 (1990); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 229 (1986); Davis, 478 U.S. at 121; Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-18 (1969).
Although the Court has largely "rested on this statement of the political question doc-
trine," Mulhern, supra note 34, at 106, it has often condensed the above formulation into
the two-pronged test mentioned in the text. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735; Davis, 478 U.S.
at 125; see also Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1082 (11 th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
38. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735.
39. See id.; Davis, 478 U.S. at 125; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
40. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Baker v. Carr, explained it this way:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch of government.., is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpreta-
tion .... ." 369 U.S. at 211. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring);
Powell, 395 U.S. at 519.
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other branch.41
Courts use the second prong of the test to examine whether there are
judicially manageable standards for resolving the controversy.42 The
Court has explained that lower courts should use this prong to determine
whether "the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach ju-
dicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded."4 Whether a particular case satisfies this two-pro-
nged test cannot be determined with absolute precision-this standard
does not provide a catalogue of instances in which the doctrine may be
invoked. Rather, a court must analyze "the precise facts and posture of
the particular case" 44 to determine whether the claim presents a nonjusti-
ciable political question. Moreover, the concepts that these prongs ad-
dress are not completely distinct.45 It may be that a case has no
judicially manageable standards because it involves a policy determina-
tion that must be decided by another branch.46
II. PAST CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL PARTY BEHAVIOR
For over fifty years,47 the Supreme Court has struggled to define the
limits of state regulation and judicial power with respect to the actions of
political parties. The Supreme Court has examined this area of law in
three lines of cases. First, in the White Primary Cases,4" the Court struck
down the Texas Democratic Party's attempts to exclude African-Ameri-
cans from voting in the Democratic primary election. Second, in O'Brien
v. Brown4 9 and Cousins v. Wigoda,50 the Court specifically addressed
challenges to the delegate selection procedures of a political party. Fi-
nally, in several recent decisions5" the Court has considered the propriety
of state attempts to regulate party activity.
A. The White Primary Cases
The White Primary Cases were the first instances of judicial interven-
tion into political party affairs. In a series of decisions spanning twenty-
six years,52 the Supreme Court struck down the Texas Democratic
41. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993); Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998
(Powell, J., concurring); Powell, 395 U.S. at 518; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
42. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring);
Powell, 395 U.S. at 517-18; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
43. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 198).
44. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 747 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
45. See id. at 735.
46. See id,
47. The first of the White Primary Cases was decided in 1927. See Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
48. See discussion infra part II.A.
49. 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam).
50. 419 U.S 477 (1975).
51. See infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
52. The first case was decided in 1927. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
The final case was decided in 1953. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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Party's repeated attempts to exclude African-Americans from voting in
state Democratic primary elections. In so doing, the Court held for the
first time that political parties could be considered state actors for some
purposes.
In Nixon v. Herndon, 3 the first of the White Primary Cases, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that explicitly excluded Afri-
can-Americans from voting in Democratic Party primary elections.5 4
The Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 5 to strike down the state's election law that expressly pro-
hibited African-Americans from voting in primary elections.5 6 Because
the plaintiff was challenging only the state election law, state action was
explicit and, therefore, no state action analysis was necessary.
The Texas legislature responded to the Court's decision by enacting a
statute that authorized each party's executive committee to determine
primary voter qualifications; 7 the Democratic Party's Executive Com-
mittee promptly passed a resolution barring African-Americans from
voting in the party's primaries. The Court invalidated the party's action
in Nixon v. Condon,58 reasoning that because the executive committee's
authority came from the state rather than from the party, the committee
was a representative of the state and, therefore, a state actor.5 9 As such,
the party's actions were subject to Equal Protection Clause scrutiny and
were invalidated on those grounds."
The Texas Democratic Party then adopted a resolution at the state
party convention that excluded African-Americans from party member-
ship. 61 In Grovey v. Townsend,62 the Supreme Court concluded that, be-
cause the convention itself made the decision to exclude, there was no
state action present. 63 Unlike Nixon v. Condon, the convention's author-
ity came solely from the party and not from the state. The discrimina-
tion was wholly private action and, therefore, not subject to
constitutional challenge. 64
Nine years later, in Smith v. Allwright,65 the Supreme Court overruled
Grovey, concluding that the party's regulation of the primary election
constituted state action.66 The Court in Allwright relied on its decision in
53. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
54. See id. at 540-41.
55. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
57. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1932).
58. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
59. See id. at 88.
60. See id. at 88-89.
61. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935).
62. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
63. See id. at 54-55.
64. See id. at 55.
65. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
66. See id. at 664.
[Vol. 62
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United States v. Classic,67 a case holding that Congress could regulate
primary elections for Representatives to Congress.68 The AlIwright
Court expanded on Classic's reasoning,69 holding that when the primary
election is by law an integral part of the general election process, the
party's regulation of that primary constitutes state action under the Fif-
teenth Amendment.70
Finally, in Terry v. Adams,7 ' the last of the White Primary Cases, the
Supreme Court struck down a parallel voting structure whereby white
members of a county party would hold a private election to select a can-
didate before the official primary.72 Although there was no majority
opinion, the plurality relied on Smith v. Allwright and concluded that,
because the winner of the private primary was the defacto winner of the
general election, the private primary was an integral enough part of the
general election machinery to constitute state action for purposes of the
Fifteenth Amendment.73
It is noteworthy that the Court never mentioned the political question
doctrine in the White Primary Cases. Although the Court invoked the
political question doctrine in other cases during that same time period, 4
each of the White Primary Cases was decided on its merits. By implica-
67. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
68. See id. at 316-18.
69. The Allwright Court explained that:
Classic bears upon Grovey v. Townsend not because exclusion of Negroes from
primaries is any more or less state action by reason of the unitary character of
the electoral process but because the recognition of the place of the primary in
the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to
fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that
may make the party's action the action of the State.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944).
70. See id at 664. It should be noted that the Allwright Court found that the party
was a state actor for purposes of the Fifteenth, not Fourteenth, Amendment. Section 1 of
the Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Coast. amend. XV, § I.
The Court has never ruled expressly whether the state action analysis is the same for
the two Amendments. Justice Frankfurter believed that there were two different stan-
dards, either because the Fifteenth Amendment specifically addresses race discrimina-
tion, or because it specifically addresses voting rights. See Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Constitution 70 (1971) ("The mandate of the Fifteenth Amendment,
however, was clearer for Mr. Justice Frankfurter than those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (text of Fourteenth Amendment).
Moreover, because voting rights are now guaranteed by statute under the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, it is unlikely that the Court will ever have occasion to consider whether
there may be a distinction in the state action analysis for voting cases.
71. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
72. See id at 463.
73. See id at 469.
74. See, eg., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (malapportionment case
held nonjusticiable because of the political question doctrine). This decision effectively
was overruled by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tion, the Court found that each case presented a justiciable claim. 75
B. The Delegate Selection Cases: O'Brien v. Brown and
Cousins v. Wigoda
The Supreme Court did not again have occasion to consider the state
action or political question doctrines as they related to political parties
until the early 1970s when two cases arose from disputes at the 1972
Democratic National Convention. As a result of conflicts between state
election laws and party rules, two sets of delegates were selected to serve
at the convention for each of several states.76 After the convention's cre-
dentials committee selected one set of delegates (the "chosen delegates")
over the other (the "excluded delegates"), the excluded delegates sought
injunctions in both federal and state courts. These related cases, O'Brien
v. Brown 77 and Cousins v. Wigoda,7s reached the Supreme Court on ap-
peals from a federal court injunction and a state court injunction,
respectively.
In O'Brien v. Brown,79 in a special term just three days before the con-
vention was scheduled to begin,"0 the Supreme Court stayed an injunc-
tion issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.s" The Court of Appeals had affirmed a decision of the district
court to enjoin the chosen delegates from participating in convention ac-
tivities, despite the fact that the party had deemed them the most fit to
serve.8 2 In staying the injunction, the Supreme Court sternly warned
lower courts not to interfere with a political party's affairs:
[N]o holding of this Court up to now gives support for judicial inter-
vention in the circumstances presented here, involving as they do rela-
tionships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature.
Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached
with great caution and restraint .... [T]he convention itself is theproper
forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be
seated.
8 3
The Court was concerned about the "[h]ighly important questions"8 4 of
justiciability and whether the actions of the party's credentials committee
constituted state action. 5 The Court reserved final resolution of the
75. See Rotunda, supra note 7, at 960 (White Primary Cases are examples of cases
involving political issues that the Court found justiciable).
76. For a more detailed explanation of the facts relating to the controversy, see Cous-
ins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 478-81 (1975).
77. 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam).
78. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
79. 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam).
80. See id. at 2.
81. See id.; see also Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (1972).
82. See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 575 (1972).





threshold issues of justiciability and state action, however, until it could
receive a full briefing. 6
Although the O'Brien Court did not overrule the earlier findings of
state action in the White Primary Cases,87 the Court limited these cases
to their facts.88 For example, the Court distinguished Smith v. Allw-
right 89 and Terry v. Adams as cases involving "invidious discrimination
based on race in a primary contest within a single State."'"
In Cousins v. Wigoda,92 the Court again declined to decide the thresh-
old issues of state action and justiciability." In Cousins, the Court re-
viewed the propriety of a state court injunction that prohibited the
chosen delegates from serving at the convention even though the party
had selected them.94 The excluded delegates had obtained both federal
and state court injunctions enjoining the chosen delegates from partici-
pating in convention activities." Although the Supreme Court had
stayed the federal injunction in O'Brien, the Illinois appellate court up-
held the state court injunction.96 The chosen delegates ignored the state
injunction, however, and consequently were held in contempt of court.9
When the case reached the Supreme Court three years later, the Court
concluded that the state court did not have the authority to enjoin the
party in this manner because the party's constitutional right of political
association98 protected it from such interference. 99
As it had done in O'Brien, however, the Court in Cousins declined to
decide the state action and political question issues. Because Cousins in-
volved a controversy concerning the state judiciary's power over a polit-
ical party,'o as opposed to a controversy between an individual and a
86. See id at 4-5. As will be shown below, the Court again refused to decide these
issues even after fuller briefing in Cousins. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
88. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1972).
89. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
90. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
91. O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 4 n.1.
92. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
93. See id at 484 n.4.
94. See id at 478-8 1.
95. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972)
(per curiam).
96. See Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E.2d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
97. See id
98. The Cousins Court explained:
The National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally pro-
tected right of political association. "There can no longer be any doubt that
freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political be-
liefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.... The right to associate with the political party of
one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom."
419 U.S. at 487 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
99. See id at 489-91.
100. In Cousins, the Court only decided the narrow issue of whether the state court
could enforce its contempt order against the party members who participated at the con-
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political party, the decision did not require resolution of the state action
and justiciability issues.10' Accordingly, the Court once again reserved
judgment on these issues.102
Cousins may represent a retreat from some of the sweeping language of
O'Brien.103 Even after receiving a full briefing," 4 the Cousins Court re-
fused O'Brien's invitation to resolve the threshold issues. The White Pri-
mary Cases, for example, limited to their facts in O'Brien,05 were cited
favorably by the Court in Cousins. 106 The Cousins Court listed the White
Primary Cases as examples of cases that may be used to determine
whether state action exists in delegate selection challenges. 107 In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Rehnquist bitterly complained 08 that Cousins
constituted a "virtual repudiation"'0 9 of O'Brien. In particular, he ques-
tioned the majority's apparent resurrection of the White Primary
Cases. "10
C. Recent Cases Involving Political Parties
Although the Court in O'Brien and Cousins failed to resolve the state
vention. Because coercive judicial action is undoubtedly state action, the Court did not
have to go through a state action analysis in this case. The Court refused to decide the
broader issue inherent in the suit-whether the party was a state actor. See id. at 483 n.4.
Moreover, because Cousins involved a review of a state court decision, the separation of
powers concerns inherent in the political question doctrine also were not implicated. See
id.; supra note 33 and accompanying text.
101. Because the parties in a criminal contempt proceeding are the state against an
individual, state action is explicit. The Cousins Court noted "that '[i]n the context of the
instant case, it is not necessary to determine whether Convention action is 'state ac-
tion."" Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483 n.4.
102. See id. The Court still has not resolved these issues. See Boyle, supra note 2, at
563 n.20.
103. See Rotunda, supra note 7, at 959 ("Cousins, however, now seems to have effec-
tively repudiated any broad reading of O'Brien."); Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-22, at 1113
("The Court apparently recognized that its comments in O'Brien were questionablej in
Cousins v. Wigoda.").
Interestingly, the seemingly different approaches taken by the Court in these decisions
cannot be attributed to a change in the Court's makeup---the same nine justices that
decided O'Brien also decided Cousins.
104. Because O'Brien was decided in a special term only three days before the conven-
tion was scheduled to begin, the Court in that case declined to decide the state action and
justiciability issues "without [the benefit ofl full briefing and argument and adequate op-
portunity for deliberation." O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 5 (1972) (per curiam).
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 n.4 (1975).
107. See id.
108. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Footnote 4 of the Court's opinion disclaims any intimation of views on [state
action and justiciability] .... But immediately following the disclaimer, the
Court proceeds to cite numerous opinions of courts of appeals and district
courts, as well as law review commentaries, which to the unsophisticated mind
might seem to portend an answer to each of these questions.
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 492-93 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
109. Id. at 494 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
110. See id. at 493-94.
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action and political question issues, these decisions reaffirmed the
strength of the associational rights of political parties.' I Since Cousins,
the Supreme Court has decided several cases concerning the extent to
which a state can regulate a political party's actions. These cases estab-
lished that a state can only regulate political party activity when it has a
compelling interest to do so.11 2 Although these cases do not provide any
guidance on the threshold issues of state action and justiciability, they
have nevertheless reinforced the primacy of a political party's associa-
tional rights.1 13
For example, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette, I 4 the Court addressed a conflict between party rules and
state election laws. Wisconsin election laws, which provided for an open
primary system,"-' contradicted Democratic Party rules, which pro-
vided that only publicly declared Democrats could participate in the se-
lection of delegates. 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
party could not disqualify the delegates selected under the election
law. 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
state's asserted interests were not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
associational rights of the party. 118
The Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of a political
party's First Amendment associational rights in Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut."9 Here, Connecticut election laws provided for
closed primaries. 2 Seeking a broader base, the Republican Party
wanted to allow independent voters to participate in its primary elec-
tion.1 2' The party sought a declaratory judgment that it could conduct a
111. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225
(1989) ("Because the ban burdens appellees' rights to free speech and free association, it
can only survive constitutional scrutiny if it serves a compelling government interest.");
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex reL La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
124-26 (1981) (because interests advanced by the state are not compelling, intrusion into
the party's affairs is not justified).
113. Although these cases demonstrate the Court's basic unwillingness to intervene
into party affairs, ironically, they also decrease the need for strict threshold standards
because they provide parties with added protection on the merits. See infra notes 225-28
and accompanying text.
114. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
115. See id. at 110-12. An "open primary" is a primary election in which a voter does
not have to be a party member to participate. An independent voter or even a member of
a different party, therefore, can vote in an open primary.
116. See id at 109-10.
117. See State ex reL La Follette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 287
N.W.2d 519, 543 (Wis. 1980).
118. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 125-26 (1981).
119. 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
120. See id at 210-12. A "closed primary" is a primary election in which only de-
clared members of a particular political party may participate. Independent voters and




primary open to independent voters. 122 The district court held for the
party, 123 and the Second Circuit affirmed. 124 The Supreme Court also
affirmed, holding that the state did not have a compelling interest suffi-
cient to justify interference with the party's associational rights. 125
The Court addressed another controversy between a political party
and a state in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Commit-
tee. 126 In Eu, California election laws forbade political parties from en-
dorsing candidates in a primary election.127 These statutes also regulated
certain aspects of a party's organization and composition. 128 The Court
invalidated these laws because they unnecessarily burdened political
speech and the associational rights of political parties. 129
These cases demonstrate that states may regulate political party activ-
ity only if there is a compelling state interest.130 A court will weigh the
rationale underlying any attempt to interfere with party affairs against
the significant associational rights of the party. 13 ' Although weighing
the relative constitutional interests of the litigants does not directly affect
the resolution of the threshold issues of state action and justiciability, the
fact that a political party's associational rights will ordinarily protect it
from interference on the merits of a dispute may eliminate the need for
strict threshold standards. 3 2 Because the party's associational rights
have been strengthened, only the most egregious examples of party con-
duct will be enjoined; the risk of inappropriate judicial interference,
therefore, has been lessened.
In sum, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning challenges to
political parties has been inconsistent. The White Primary Cases demon-
strated that political parties may be considered state actors for some pur-
poses. O'Brien v. Brown suggested that courts should use the state action
and political question doctrines to insulate parties from judicial re-
122. See id. at 213.
123. See Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 599 F. Supp. 1228, 1241 (D. Conn.
1984).
124. See Republican Party of Conn. v. Tashjian, 770 F.2d 265, 286 (2d Cir. 1985).
125. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986).
126. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
127. See id. at 216-19.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 231-32.
130. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
131. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) ("The free-
dom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes partisan
political organization."); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) ("[T]he freedom to associate for the 'common advance-
ment of political beliefs,' necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who
constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only." (citations
omitted)).
132. Because a challenge to party behavior must implicate a compelling interest in
order to prompt judicial intervention into party affairs, there is little danger of unwar-
ranted judicial interference. Strict threshold standards, therefore, are not necessary and
the merits may be reached. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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view.133 The Court seemed to retreat from O'Brien, however, in Cousins
v. Wigoda.'34 Although recent cases have made it clear that political
parties have strong associational rights that will protect them from most
judicial interference on the merits of a dispute,'"5 these cases did nothing
to resolve the status of the threshold questions of state action and jus-
ticiability. As we shall see, this inconsistent treatment by the Supreme
Court has led to differing approaches in the lower courts.
III. ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The inconsistent messages that the Supreme Court has provided on the
issues of state action and justiciability have been reflected in lower court
decisions. Although no party has lost a delegate selection challenge after
O'Brien and Cousins, the conflicting approaches used by the Court in
these decisions has produced inconsistent applications by the lower
courts. Accordingly, an examination is warranted into how the lower
courts have addressed delegate selection challenges since Cousins v.
Wigoda.' 36
A. Lower Courts' Resolution of State Action Issues
Lower courts have arrived at different conclusions as to whether dele-
gate selection constitutes state action. The Second Circuit has hinted
that state action may be present in political party delegate selection. On
two occasions, that circuit has indicated in dicta that the delegate selec-
tion procedures of a political party will constitute state action if a state
grants the party's candidate automatic access to the general election
ballot. 137
Other courts, however, have held that a political party's delegate selec-
tion activities do not constitute state action. 3 8 These courts have rea-
soned that the mere fact that a state law authorizes the selection of a
candidate is insufficient to turn the private selection decision into state
action.1 39 They conclude that the party's private action can touch on the
state's interest in elections without rising to the level of state action."4
133. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
137. See Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890, 895 n.8 (2d Cir.
1980); Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378, 383 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 788, 790 (1978)); see also Bachur v. Democratic
Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 839-40 (4th Cir. 1987) (district court's finding of state action
not addressed on appeal). But see Cavallo v. Elk Grove Township Republican Cent.
Comm., No. 85 C 1501, 1985 WL 3921, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1985) (declining to
follow Mrazek).
138. See Cavallo, 1985 WL 3921, at *4; Jackson v. Michigan State Democratic Party,
593 F. Supp. 1033, 1045 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Ferency v. Secretary of State, 362 N.W.2d
743, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
139. See Cavallo, 1985 WL 3921, at *4.
140. See id
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
Several lower courts presented with state action questions in delegate
selection challenges have refused to decide the issue. Following the
Supreme Court's example,14 1 they have reserved judgment on the state
action issue 142 and instead either have decided the cases on justiciability
grounds143 or have ignored the threshold issues of state action and jus-
ticiability altogether and decided the cases on the merits.144
B. Lower Courts' Resolution of Justiciability Issues
The question of whether delegate selection challenges pose nonjusticia-
ble political questions is also unsettled. Several courts, including the
Eleventh Circuit, have expressly held that a delegate selection challenge
is a nonjusticiable political question. 45 These courts follow O'Brien's
reasoning 146 that a party convention-and not a courtroom-is the
proper place for resolving intra-party disputes such as delegate selection
challenges.' 47  Also relying on O'Brien, the Eleventh Circuit distin-
guished the White Primary Cases of Smith v. Alwright 14' and Terry v.
Adams, 149 arguing that the Court's quick intervention in those cases was
attributable to the political party's invidious discrimination.' 50
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit reached opposite conclusions concerning
justiciability in two cases decided just one year apart.' 5' One suit chal-
lenged a delegate selection mechanism contained in the state election
law, "'52 while the other challenged the selection procedures contained in
141. See supra notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
142. See Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1077 (11 th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican
Party, 525 F.2d 567, 578 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933
(1976).
143. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1077.
144. The District of Columbia Circuit noted, for example: "We recognize that 'state
action' and 'justiciability' are often regarded as threshold issues. We see nothing illogical
about passing over them, however, and we certainly do not lack authority for doing so."
Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 578 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
Although Professor Laurence H. Tribe suggests that the Supreme Court is increasingly
using threshold issues to dispose of difficult cases, see Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-22, at
1113 n.9, cases like O'Brien and Cousins may simply be examples of cases in which the
threshold issues are more difficult to resolve than the merits.
145. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1082; Guy v. Delaware Democratic Party, Civ.A.No.
12482, 1992 WL 58515, at *2 (Del. Ch. March 24, 1992); Stuckey v. Richardson, 372
S.E.2d 458, 460 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912 (Ga. 1988).
146. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
147. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1082-83; Stuckey, 372 S.E.2d at 460.
148. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
149. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
150. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1082 n.27.
151. See Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Ken-
tucky Democratic Party, 872 F.2d 1029, No. 88-6114, text available in WESTLAW, 1989
WL 40176, at *1 (6th Cir. April 13, 1989).
152. See Heitmanis, 899 F.2d at 522-23.
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party rules.153 The former case was determined to be justiciable'I while
the latter was not. 155 While the Sixth Circuit's distinction would cer-
tainly be relevant for state action analysis,' 56 its application to the polit-
ical question doctrine is dubious-the political question doctrine
traditionally has reflected separation of powers conflicts and concerns
over the policy determinations necessary to resolve a controversy, rather
than the identity of the parties involved. 5 7
Yet another analysis has been suggested by the District of Columbia
Circuit'58 and the Fourth Circuit."5 9 These courts have argued that the
analysis required to determine the justiciability issue is similar to the
analysis required to determine the claim on its merits. These courts have
concluded that they cannot determine the justiciability issue without first
analyzing the implicated constitutional rights of the litigants.16° In each
instance, recognizing the Supreme Court's silence on the matter, '6 these
courts likewise reserved the justiciability issue and concluded on the mer-
its that the party's associational rights outweighed the challenger's
interests. 162
IV. JUDICIAL REVIE\V OF A POLITICAL PARTY'S NOMINATION
AcTIvrrIEs
As the previous section pointed out, the lower courts have taken differ-
ent approaches to the resolution of the state action and justiciability
questions following the Supreme Court's reservation of these issues in
O'Brien and Cousins. More recent Supreme Court state action and jus-
ticiability decisions in other contexts, however, shed significant light on
these issues. These decisions make it clear that the courts should not use
the threshold issues of state action and justiciability to insulate political
153. See Thompson, 1989 WL 40176, at *1 (claim that delegate selection procedures
were per se racially discriminatory held nonjusticiable).
154. See Heitmanis, 899 F.2d at 526.
155. See Thompson v. Kentucky Democratic Party, 872 F.2d 1029, No. 88-6114, text
available in WESTLAW, 1989 WL 40176, at *1 (6th Cir. April 13, 1989).
156. For example, if the state election law is being challenged, state action is explicitly
present-the adoption of the statute is the action of the state. If the party rule is being
challenged, the state action doctrine analysis must be employed to determine whether the
party is deemed a state actor. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
157. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986). See also supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text; infra notes
212-18 and accompanying text.
158. See Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
159. See Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 841-42 (4th Cir. 1987).
160. See id; Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 578.
161. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841; Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 576.
162. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 840-42; Ripon Soc'y, 525 F.2d at 578. See also Boyle,
supra note 2, at 573 ("By concluding that the merits of the dispute were indistinguishable
from the justiciability issue, the court of appeals merely avoided resolving an issue upon
which the Supreme Court has yet to give guidance." (citations omitted) (commenting on
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bachur)).
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parties from judicial review. Moreover, several important doctrinal de-
velopments have emerged since O'Brien and Cousins that decrease the
need to dismiss cases on threshold issues. Furthermore, important policy
considerations support reaching the merits in challenges to a political
party's nomination activities so that a fair electoral process can be better
ensured.
A. Delegate Selection as State Action
Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Court's two-prong
state action test 63 suggest that a political party's delegate selection pro-
cedures constitute state action under section 1983. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the first prong of the state action test as considering
"whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exer-
cise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority."' ' 4 For
example, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,165 the Court held that a
private litigant was a state actor while carrying out a peremptory strike
of a prospective juror in a civil suit.' 66 In Georgia v. McCollum, 67 the
Court extended the application of this state action rationale to criminal
cases.' 68 In each case, the first prong of the state action test was satisfied
because the peremptory challenge of a potential juror held "no signifi-
cance outside a court of law."' 169 Because peremptory challenges have no
significance outside of court, the Supreme Court concluded that the per-
emptory strikes were the result of "the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority."' 7 °
Applying the above analysis, the nomination procedures of a political
party, including the selection of convention delegates, may be viewed as
constituting state action-nomination activities hold no significance
outside the context of electing representatives to government office.'
When a party nominates a candidate for government office, it exercises
"a right or privilege having its source in state authority."'' 72 Nominating
a candidate for public office simply has no relevance outside the govern-
ment sanctioned election process. Accordingly, under the reasoning of
163. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
164. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I11 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-83 (1991).
165. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
166. See id. at 2083.
167. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
168. See id. at 2354-57.
169. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991); see also Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-55 (1992).
170. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
171. One lower court has used the Edmonson analysis in the same way: "Just as liti-
gants exercising peremptory challenges are serving an important function within the gov-
ernment and acting with its substantial assistance, banks drafting conversion plans are in
a limited sense also called upon to perform the government's protective function by pre-
paring plans that meet the statutory fairness requirements." Lovell v. Peoples Heritage
Sav. Bank, 776 F. Supp. 578, 588 (D. Me. 1991) (citation omitted).
172. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2082-83.
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Edmonson, a political party's delegate selection procedures satisfy the
first prong of the state action test.
Delegate selection activities also satisfy the second prong of the state
action test.'7 3 By applying this second prong a court determines whether
a party can be fairly deemed to be a state actor. Although this test is
largely a factual inquiry,1 4 the Court has pointed out that several char-
acteristics are particularly relevant to this analysis. 7" Among the factors
that militate in favor of a finding of state action are a reliance on govern-
ment assistance, a performance of a traditional government function, and
an aggravation of the injury through incidents of governmental
authority.
176
The non-financial 177 support that major political parties receive is suffi-
cient to satisfy the second prong of the state action test and thereby
transform the party into a state actor. This finding of state action is most
supported by the so-called "state non-financial facilitation"'7 " line of
cases.17 9 In these cases, state action was found where the government
facilitated the private action, or provided the context in which the private
action took place. The rule of these cases is that state action exists when
a private party makes use of a state procedure with the assistance of state
officials."8 Courts applying this rationale have found state action in
cases that involved jury peremptory challenges,' 8 ' state pre-judgment at-
173. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
174. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., II1 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991); see also
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
175. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
176. See iL at 2083; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
177. Although government assistance is one of the relevant characteristics of the state
action test, financial assistance by itself is insufficient to transform the aid recipient into a
state actor. The Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), a case involving a
private school that received much of its funding from government contracts, held that
financial support alone is insufficient to constitute state action. See id. at 840-41. "As
long as the financial benefit is not provided according to constitutionally impermissible
criteria," Snyder, supra note 7, at 1079, the assistance does not transform the private
party into a state actor unless it "constitutes compulsion or encouragement of that pri-
vate action." Id The mere fact that political parties receive large amounts of financial
assistance from the states and federal governments is, therefore, insufficient to constitute
state action.
178. This is Professor Rotunda's term. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitu-
tional Law: Cases and Notes 461-76 (1989).
179. See, eg., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (criminal defendants who
strike jurors due to their race are state actors because the state has provided a context in
which to act); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (private liti-
gants in a civil suit who strike jurors in peremptory challenges are state actors); Washing-
ton v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (non-neutral allocation of government
power transforms private parties into state actors); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (statute making it easier to discriminate violates Equal Protection Clause and
transforms private action into state action).
180. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988);
Barnes v. Maytag Corp., 799 F. Supp. 926, 930 (S.D. 11. 1992).
181. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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tachment procedures, 18 2 private action taken under statutes that facili-
tated discrimination,18 3 and instances in which a bank engaged in
conduct pursuant to statutory authorization.18 4 In contrast, mere finan-
cial assistance185 or state regulation of an activity' 86 is not enough to
result in a finding of state action.
Non-financial facilitation giving rise to state action results where the
state gives the nominee of a political party automatic access to the gen-
eral election ballot.8 7 By affording this automatic access, the state pro-
vides sufficient non-financial assistance so as to allow a political party to
be fairly considered a state actor.188 Doctrinal justification for this con-
clusion may be traced to Smith v. Allwright,8 9 in which the Supreme
Court employed this rationale to transform a political party's regulation
of a primary election into state action. 9 Applying the Supreme Court's
reasoning to other political party actions, it follows that all nomination
activities, including the selection of convention delegates, should consti-
tute state action. Professor Laurence Tribe has advocated extending the
182. Compare Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486
(1988) (substantial involvement of probate court in functioning of nonclaim statute war-
rants finding of state action) and Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
(finding state action where state official assists in attachment procedures) with Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (refusing to find state action when property
was attached without the assistance of state officials).
183. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
184. See Lovell v. Peoples Heritage Say. Bank, 776 F. Supp. 578, 581-82 (D. Me.
1991).
185. Financial assistance without more is insufficient to justify a finding of state action.
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school that received nearly all
of its funding from the state was not a state actor as long as the decision was not made
nor compelled by the state); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 992 (1982) (private nursing
home that received nearly all of its funds from government sources not a state actor
unless decision made or compelled by government).
186. The Court has demonstrated that regulation does not imply state action as long as
the regulation does not mandate the unconstitutional action. See Tribe, supra note 15,
§ 13-23, at 1120 (recent Court decisions cast doubt on whether state regulation of the
nominating process is sufficient to constitute state action); see, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982) (involving the transfer of Medicaid patients); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (involving a state-regulated utility monopoly); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (involving a state-licensed establishment).
187. The nominee of the each major political party is given automatic access to the
general election ballot in every state. See Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-23, at 1121; see, e.g.,
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 211 (1986) (major party candidates
automatically accorded general election ballot access).
188. See Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890, 895 n.8 (2d Cir.
1980); Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378, 383 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978); Tribe, supra note 15,
§ 13-23, at 1121; see also O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (per curiam) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (as long as state recognizes "fruits" of party selection, nomination
activities are state action).
189. 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
190. In Allwright, the Court held that, because the state first compelled the party to
select a candidate for inclusion on the ballot, and thereafter accepted the party's selection
for inclusion on the general election ballot, the party's actions constituted state action.
See id. at 664.
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Allwright state action analysis to the context of delegate selection'"' and
the Second Circuit has agreed with this position in dicta. 192
Furthermore, because the selection of a candidate through the primary
election system could be construed as a public function, parties may be
considered state actors in their nominating processes even if the state has
not afforded the benefit of ballot access.193 For example, in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.,194 the Court cited Terry v. Adams 91 as a case in
which a private party performed a traditional government function.' 96
In Terry, the last of the White Primary Cases, the Supreme Court found
state action to exist because the party's action had become "an integral
part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that determines
who shall rule and govern."' 97 Because the nominating activities of the
major political parties have such a significant impact on the general elec-
tion result,19 it can be argued that a party's procedure to select a candi-
date is "an integral part ... of the elective process," and therefore should
be considered a public function. It follows that all integral steps of the
nomination process, including the selection of convention delegates,
should be subjected to constitutional scrutiny.' 99
In light of the above analysis, the state action doctrine retains its vital-
ity in defining the limits of appropriate judicial intervention. Under this
formulation, the only political party activities that would constitute state
action are nomination activities and the regulation of primary elections.
Professor Tribe has argued that the White Primary Cases and later state
action decisions support the proposition that, while nomination activities
191. See Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-23, at 1121.
192. See Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890, 894 n.8 (2d Cir.
1980); Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378, 383 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978). But see Cavallo v.
Elk Grove Township Republican Cent. Comm., No. 85 C 1501, 1985 WL 3921, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1985) (declining to follow Mrazek).
193. Professor Rotunda wrote:
Terry v. Adams supports the argument that even if the state withdrew from
such regulation, the pre-election selection process might still be an integral part
of the election. It is immaterial under Terry whether or not the state has given a
preferred position on the ballot to the nominee of a completely private primary.
Rotunda, supra note 7, at 956 n. 114 (citation omitted).
194. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
195. 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
196. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083 (1991); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. 2348, 2355-2356 (1992) (citing Terry in support of the proposition that the state can-
not avoid its constitutional responsibilities by delegating a public function to a private
party).
197. 345 U.S. at 469 (Black, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
198. See Paul Carman, Comment, Cousins and La Follette: An Anomaly Created by a
Choice Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 666,
683, 691 (1985) (electoral success without party nomination unlikely); Tribe, supra note
15, § 13-22, at 1115 (nomination processes of major parties have great influence on gen-
eral election).
199. See Rotunda, supra note 7, at 956 (because convention delegates are responsible
for nominating a candidate, the selection of delegates is an integral enough part of the
nomination process to support a finding of state action); Carman, supra note 197, at 691
(arguing that Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams support finding of state action).
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of a party are state action,2" all other party activities constitute private
action-and are, therefore, beyond the reach of constitutional chal-
lenge.2"' Accordingly, the state action doctrine still plays its traditional
role of determining the boundary between public and private action.
B. The Justiciability of Delegate Selection Challenges
The political question doctrine also should not prohibit courts from
examining challenges to the delegate selection procedures of political
parties. As previously discussed,2 "2 the Supreme Court has developed a
two-prong test for determining whether a claim is nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine. Because challenges to political party ac-
tion do not offend either prong of the political question doctrine test,
courts should reach the merits in claims against political parties.
The first concern of the political question doctrine is whether an im-
permissible policy determination must be made to resolve the dispute.20 3
A policy determination is deemed inappropriate if it is the type of deci-
sion that should be made by one of the other branches of government.2 °4
The Court has tested this concern by inquiring whether there is "a textu-
ally demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department. ' 205 A challenge to a political party's delegate selec-
tion procedures does not infringe on the rights of the executive branch or
Congress. The separation of powers concerns that underlie this doctrine
are simply not implicated.20 6 Justice Marshall pointed out that "the full
200. See Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-23, at 1119. Professor Tribe wrote:
Read in the context of other state action cases, the White Primary Cases seem
to support the proposition that all activities of political parties that are closely
related to the nomination of a candidate who will receive some preferential state
treatment as the nominee of a political party are deemed the state's responsibil-
ity; other activities of political parties constitute private action.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Rotunda, supra note 7, at 952 ("An analysis of the White
Primary Cases and their progeny indicates that ... all integral steps in an election for
public office are public functions and therefore state action subject to some constitutional
scrutiny.").
201. See Tribe, supra note 15, § 13-23, at 1119; Boyle, supra note 2, at 570; see also
Banchy v. Republican Party, 898 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1990) (party not subject to
suit for filling internal position); Blank v. Heineman, 771 F. Supp. 1013, 1018-19 (D.
Neb. 1991) (internal affairs of party not state action); McMenamin v. Philadelphia
County Democratic Executive Comm., 405 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (internal
party affairs not state action).
202. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
204. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) ("[The] doctrine is
designed to restrain the judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the
other branches of Government."); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitution-
ally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch.")
205. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
206. One author, commenting on a Fourth Circuit delegate selection case, argued that
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convention of the National Democratic Party... is most assuredly not a
coordinate branch of government to which the federal courts owe defer-
ence within the meaning of the separation of powers or the political ques-
tion doctrine."2 °7  Indeed, far from infringing on Congress's
prerogatives, the Court has concluded that Congress designed section
1983 to provide for the private enforcement of federal rights."'
Constitutional challenges to the acts of political parties also do not
offend the second prong of the political question doctrine test. The test's
second prong examines whether judicially manageable standards exist for
resolving the controversy. 2 9 In a constitutional challenge to a political
party's delegate selection procedures, a court would have to weigh the
constitutional rights of the challenger against the associational rights of
the party. Such a balancing of the litigants' relative constitutional and
statutory rights implicates standards that are applied by federal courts
every day.21 Far from being unmanageable, challenges based on free
exercise, establishment, equal protection, due process, and many other
constitutional rights have long histories of judicial resolution with stan-
dards rooted in established doctrines. A court may not avoid deciding a
particular case simply because the case's resolution will have political
ramifications.211
Some authorities have argued that only challenges to political party
actions based upon claims of race discrimination or Fifteenth Amend-
ment violations are justiciable. Both Justice Frankfurter 21 2 and Justice
"it is doubtful that a political question was raised since... the separation of powers
doctrine... [is not] implicated." Boyle, supra note 2, at 573 (commenting on Bachur v.
Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987)).
207. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is an
indication that the Court later agreed with Justice Marshall and retreated from its
O'Brien language in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). See supra notes 103-10 and
accompanying text. It is important to note that Justice Marshall joined the majority in
Cousins.
208. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to
deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.");
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S 90, 100-01, 110 (1980).
209. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990) ("[Tlhe in-
quiry, which involves the analysis of statutes and legislative materials, is one that is famil-
iar to the courts and often central to the judicial function."); Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Resolution of the ques-
tion may not be easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation
to the constitutional provisions at issue."); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("Both these determinations are well within the range of questions
regularly presented to courts for decision, and capable of judicial resolution.").
211. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
("[O]ne of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk
this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.");
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) ("[T]he mere fact that the suit seeks protection of
a political right does not mean it presents a political question.").
212. See Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Constitution 74 (1971).
Justice Frankfurter concurred in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), a Fifteenth
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
O'Connor,213 for example, have advocated the use of different jus-
ticiability standards for race and non-race cases.21 4 Recently, however,
the Supreme Court held that the same justiciability standard should ap-
ply to both race and non-race cases. In Davis v. Bandemer,215 a redis-
tricting challenge based on non-racial grounds, the majority216 expressly
rejected a two-tiered approach and held that the characteristics of the
complaining group were irrelevant. 217 The Court has since reaffirmed
this holding.218
C. Doctrinal Developments
Since O'Brien v. Brown,21 9 several important developments have
demonstrated that courts can proceed beyond the threshold issues of
state action and justiciability in challenges to political party nomination
activities. These developments show that the merits in these disputes can
be reached without offending the basic policy interests inherent in
O'Brien's admonishment to lower courts to avoid interfering with party
affairs.220 Several factors demonstrate that current Supreme Court juris-
prudence can adequately protect political parties from inappropriate in-
terference without requiring a dismissal of the case on threshold issues.
First, judicial experience since O'Brien has shown that political parties
have repeatedly prevailed in these challenges even when the merits have
Amendment race discrimination challenge and wrote the majority opinion in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a case involving a Fifteenth Amendment challenge to a
redistricting scheme that obviously discriminated on the basis of race. Outside the con-
text of racial discrimination, however, he was much more likely to find a nonjusticiable
political question. For example, two years after Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter authored
a dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which he argued that this
non-racial malapportionment challenge presented a nonjusticiable political question. See
id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
213. Justice O'Connor had suggested the adoption of a two-tiered analysis with differ-
ent standards for race-based cases and non-race-based cases. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 151-52 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court, however, expressly re-
jected Justice O'Connor's argument. See id. at 125-27.
214. Recall also that O'Brien v. Brown distinguished the White Primary Cases of Smith
v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams as cases involving "invidious discrimination based on
race in a primary contest within a single State." O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 n.l
(1972) (per curiam); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 232 (1989) (distinguishing Allwright as a case involving derogation of the liti-
gant's civil rights).
215. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (involving a dilution of voting rights that did not produce a
racially discriminatory effect).
216. See id. at 125. Indeed, this was the only part of the opinion which commanded a
majority.
217. See id.
218. Writing for the Court in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990),
Justice Marshall explained that the political question doctrine "is designed to restrain the
Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Gov-
ernment; the identity of the litigant is immaterial to the presence of these concerns in a
particular case." Id. at 394.
219. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
220. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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been reached.221 In fact, Cousins v. Wigoda is an example of a case in
which the Court was able to protect a political party's prerogatives with-
out dismissing the case on a threshold issue.m2 Moreover, several lower
courts have reached the merits of delegate selection challenges, either by
refusing to resolve the threshold issues of state action and jus-
ticiability,22 or by holding that the threshold issues and the merits can-
not be separated. 4 In each case, the political party's associational rights
have protected it from inappropriate judicial intervention.
Second, because the Court has made it clear in cases since O'Brien that
political parties have strong associational rights," 5 there is less danger of
inappropriate judicial meddling into party business. Three recent
Supreme Court decisions" 6 involving state attempts to regulate political
party behavior have shown that only the most compelling interests will
justify interference into party affairs. 2  Ironically, although these cases
demonstrate the Court's basic unwillingness to inject itself into party
matters, the added protection that these cases provide to a party on the
merits decreases the need for strict threshold standards. By resolving
cases on their merits instead of resorting to formulaic threshold stan-
dards, courts will have the flexibility to address cases involving outra-
geous party behavior. Therefore, courts will be capable of remedying
instances of invidious discrimination, such as those in the hypotheticals
about the atheist Republican and the non-minority Democrat, while, at
the same time, the party's strong associational rights will protect it
against judicial overreaching."
221. See supra notes 111-32, 144, 162 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
223. See Ferency v. Austin, 666 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1981).
224. See Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 578 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc) (arguing that the issue of justiciability is inseparable from determination
of the merits of the case), cert denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l
Party, 836 F.2d 837, 840 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e do not think that the questions of jus-
ticiability and the merits may, in this case, be approached and decided as separate and
distinct issues.").
225. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842.
226. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989);
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin ex reL La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); supra notes 114-29
and accompanying text.
227. See David Lubecky, Comment, Setting Voter Qualifications for State Primary
Elections: Reassertion of the Right of State Political Parties to Self-Determination, 55 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 799, 803-04 (1987); Jeffrey L. Anderson, Note, March Fong Eu v. San Fran-
cisco County Democratic Central Committee: Tension Between Associational Rights of
Political Parties and Fair Elections, 16 J. Contemp. L. 381, 384 (1990).
228. See Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890, 896-97 n. 1 (2d Cir.
1980) (party decisions should not be overturned unless they disadvantage discrete groups
or minorities); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 589 n.66 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc) (refusing to hold no state action and no justiciability because such a
holding would leave no room to address cases of invidious discrimination), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 933 (1976); Stuckey v. Richardson, 372 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)
(Deen, J., dissenting in part) (case involves a compelling interest, therefore, party action
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D. Additional Policy Considerations
An additional factor that should not be overlooked is that the Ameri-
can system of government may be adversely affected if delegate selection
challenges are summarily dismissed on threshold issues. Some authori-
ties have argued that it is antidemocratic to allow a lifetime-tenured fed-
eral judge the power to intervene into party affairs.229 Because the two
major political parties in this country hold an oligopoly on opportunities
for political expression at the national level, 2 0 however, allowing the
Democratic and Republican parties free reign to act in contravention of
the Constitution is itself antidemocratic.23' As Professor Ronald D. Ro-
tunda has persuasively argued, the White Primary Cases should govern
delegate selection challenges because "there is a proper and necessary
place for the courts as overseers of the political process. ' '232 The courts
will be unable to perform adequately their role as overseers unless they
can proceed beyond the threshold issues and reach the merits of a
challenge.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has struggled for over fifty years to de-
fine the scope of judicial review of political party behavior, it has never
should be invalidated), cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912 (Ga. 1988); see also Rotunda,
supra note 7, at 939-40.
229. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, de-
pends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system,
which permits both stability and measured change .... To turn these matters
over to the federal judiciary is to inject the courts into the most heated partisan
issues. . . .The consequences of this shift will be as immense as they are
unfortunate.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.) ("It is hostile to a demo-
cratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.").
These authorities argue that improper acts by political parties will self-correct in the
marketplace of the electorate. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 152 (political gerrymandering is a
self-limiting exercise) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lubecky, supra note 227, at 827 (even
without judicial oversight, parties do not have unfettered discretion); Philip B. Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Constitution 64 (1971) (when people have demanded
democracy in the past, they have received it without judicial intervention).
230. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
23 1. Professor Rotunda wrote:
Having based Cousins on the transcending importance of national political par-
ties and their candidate selection process, it would be anomalous for the Court
to look with favor on the argument that national parties may discriminate on
the basis of some suspect classification. Nor would the Cousins Court be
charmed by an assertion that a disenfranchised minority need only join some
other, more tolerant party.
Rotunda, supra note 7, at 946.
232. Id. at 963; see also Stuckey v. Richardson, 372 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (Deen, J., dissenting in part) (judiciary has duty to require fair political process to
ensure a meaningful right to vote), cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912 (Ga. 1988).
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clearly articulated the roles that the state action and political question
doctrines play in this context. Lower courts at times have used the
threshold issues of state action and justiciability to immunize political
parties from judicial review.
A close examination of Supreme Court state action and political ques-
tion doctrine decisions, however, suggests that a political party's delegate
selection procedures should not be immune from constitutional chal-
lenge. Political party nominating activities, including delegate selection,
constitute state action. Moreover, because separation of powers concerns
simply are not implicated, challenges to party actions do not present non-
justiciable political questions. Rather, challenges to political party action
should be resolved on the merits of each case; on the merits, the party's
strong associational rights will protect it from judicial interference in all
but the most egregious instances of party behavior. By proceeding be-
yond the threshold issues of state action and justiciability, the courts will
best be able to discharge their responsibility of assuring that our electoral
system is administered fairly.

